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Abstract. Implantable medical devices (IMDs), such as pacemakers,
implanted cardiac defibrillators and neurostimulators are medical de-
vices implanted into patients’ bodies for monitoring physiological signals
and performing medical treatments. Many IMDs have built-in wireless
communication modules to facilitate data collecting and device repro-
gramming by external programmers. The wireless communication brings
significant conveniences for advanced applications such as real-time and
remote monitoring but also introduces the risk of unauthorized wire-
less access. The absence of effective access control mechanisms exposes
patients’ life to cyber attacks. In this paper, we present a lightweight
and universally applicable access control system for IMDs. By leverag-
ing Physically Obfuscated Keys (POKs) as the hardware root of trust,
provable security is achieved based on standard cryptographic primi-
tives while attaining high energy efficiency. In addition, barrier-free IMD
access under emergent situations is realized by utilizing the patient’s
biometrical information. We evaluate our proposed scheme through ex-
tensive security analysis and a prototype implementation, which demon-
strate our work’s superiority on security and energy efficiency.
Keywords: Implantable Medical Devices · Physical Obfuscation Keys
· Access Control.
1 Introduction
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) are electronic devices that can be either
partially or fully implanted into patients’ bodies for collecting patients’ phys-
iological data and delivering timely treatment. With advantages of providing
ongoing diagnosis and treatment, IMDs have been pervasively used for treating
chronic medical disorders and are proved to be effective in coping with sudden
deaths caused by cardiac arrests and ventricular arrhythmia [34]. Most IMDs are
equipped with radio modules for wireless communication with external devices
called programmers which are used by physicians for data exporting and IMD
reprogramming. However, the wireless communication brings attackers extra ar-
senal to threaten the users’ lives with cyber attacks. Jay Radcliffe and Branaby
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Jack have demonstrated the feasibility to remotely hack the insulin pump in [37]
and [1] respectively. Coincidentally, former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney had
the wireless connection of his implanted defibrillator disabled due to the concern
of cyber attacks launched by terrorists [19].
Although countermeasures against unauthorized IMD access are critical, the
design is challenging due to two technical difficulties. First, requirements for
utility and security are conflicting. On the one hand, the scheme must be robust
enough to defeat all malicious access. On the other hand, during the emergent
situation, first-aiders may need to access or reprogram a patient’s IMD imme-
diately without any hindering caused by security mechanisms. Second, the IMD
security mechanism must be extremely energy efficient because IMDs are im-
planted into human’s bodies via surgeries and rely on their embedded batteries
to operate many years.
To cope with these security problems of medical devices, a series of research
works are proposed [23, 24, 45]. Recent researches tend to address the first diffi-
culty with the touch-to-access principle which is based on a reasonable assump-
tion that attackers having physical contact with victims can harm them directly
(rather than utilizing IMDs). Following this, many proposed solutions [16,41,47]
implement simple access control policies by verifying physical access or proximity
for IMD access attempts. However, these proposed works have three drawbacks.
(1) Their enforcement of the touch-to-access policy is not based on provable se-
curity and may be breached by newly-developed attack techniques [40]. (2) They
assume IMDs are equipped with special sensing or communication capabilities
like ECG measurement and piezo broadcasting. (3) Simple touch-to-access access
control policy cannot deal with complicated scenarios like hierarchical privileges.
Our goal is to design an IMD access control solution that provides provable
security without high energy consumption. To that end, we present a Physical
Obfuscation Keys (POKs) based IMD access control system. Leveraging a POKs
enabled IC card for secure credential storage, we design a lightweight access
control protocol with minimal computation and communication overhead on
IMDs. For emergent access, We follow the touch-to-access principle and verify
physical contact by requiring the patient’s IC card and iris image. Our design is
built on standard cryptographic operations to provide provable security and does
not need any special sensing or communication capability of the IMD. Moreover,
an online Hospital Authentication Server (HAS) is integrated in our system to
authenticate the programmer’s identity and realize the dynamic and fine-grained
access control.
In summary, our work has the following contributions:
– A novel POKs based key agreement scheme: We innovatively use the POKs
enabled IC card to design a secure key agreement scheme for IMDs. In our
proposed protocol, computation-intensive operations are offloaded to the IC
card and the Hospital Authentication Server to reduce the energy consump-
tion of the IMD.
– Biometrics based emergent access: We design a highly secure method that
uses the patient’s iris for barrier-free emergent access.
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– Real-device implementation: We implement the IMD’s logic on the TelosB
sensor mote, analyze the security properties of the design, and evaluate the
energy consumption to show our design’s advantage of energy efficiency as
well as its speed and memory consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first describe some back-
ground on POKs and our key generation in Section 2. Then we present the
system and threat model in section 3. Our access control scheme for normal
access and emergent access is described in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. After
that, we analyze the security of our work in Section 6 and the results of the
overhead consumption evaluation are presented in Section 7. The review of the
related works is in Section 8. Finally, we conclude in Section 9.
2 Background and Key Generation
2.1 Background: Physical Obfuscation Keys
Modern crytographic primitives have their security based on the confidentiality
of secret credentials. Once the credentials are uncovered, attackers can mali-
ciously impersonate legitimate users or retrieve sensitive information from en-
crypted communications. Thus, secure secret key storage components such are
critical to the security of all kinds of applications. However, recently developed
physical tampering attacks such as micro-probing attack and electrical glitching
attack have already showed their effectiveness on retrieving secret credentials
kept in statical storage devices.
To defeat these physical attacks targeting secret credentials, researches pro-
pose the Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [38] as a hardware-based cryp-
tographic component for authentication and secret key storage. PUFs rely on
unique physical characteristic variation as the secret challenge-response pattern.
When given an input, the PUF responses with a corresponding unpredictable
output. These patterns are determined by the PUF’s unique and unclonable
physical properties such as the integrated circuit’s gate propagation delay [31]
and SRAM cell initial status [25] which are introduced by uncontrollable vari-
ations during the IC fabrication process. Generally, PUFs are divided into two
broad categories: strong PUFs and weak PUFs, differing in the number of avail-
able Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs). Typically, strong PUFs can have a large
set of CRPs while weak PUFs only support a limited number of CRPs. The Phys-
ically Obfuscated Keys (POKs) [15] is an application of weak PUFs that could
be considered as a secure key storage techinique. The appearance of this tech-
nique brings a reliable solution to protect the secret key from being compromised
by invasive side-channel attacks. Recent POKs-based secure key generators have
reached a bit error rate of less than 1% [27] and require no special processing
during the chip fabrication, making it a cost-efficient alternative to expensive
secure storage components like EEPROM.
Bringer, et al. make a further step by proposing POKs compatible crypto-
graphic algorithms [3] to defeat the runtime memory scanning attacks which
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aim to steal the credentials after they are loaded to the memory. They achieve
it by splitting scalar product and exclusive OR (XOR), two basic operations
used in the linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), into multiple steps. During
each step, only part of the secret stored in the POKs are loaded to the memory
with all intermediate results obfuscated. Based on the specially designed LFSR,
secure POKs enabled stream ciphers like Trivium [6] is realized. Therefore, com-
pared with the traditional primitives, POKs enabled cryptographic operations
are resilient to memory scanning attacks. Moreover, invasive tampering at-
tacks that try to unpack the chip will change physical features the keys rely on
and thus destroy the the secret inside it permanently. Thus, revealing keys via
invasive tampering attacks also fail.
2.2 Key Pair Generator
For multi-party communication, key management (e.g., [10–12,46] is important
for medical and IoT devices. We design a key generator to synchronously generate
temporary keys for each access. As shown in Figure 1, the key generator has the
input of a master key and an initial value fed into a Trivium stream generator.
During each access, 256 bits are truncated from the output stream and then
be processed by the SHA-256 module to get a 256-bit temporary key. In the
system, we have two different long-term master keys Key1 and Key2 to derive
two temporary keys SAi and SBi. Key1 and Key2 are stored by the patient’s IC
card and the HAS (Hospital Authentication Server), respectively, and the IMD
stores the two master keys.
Fig. 1. The key pair generator. SAi and SBi are generated by patient’s IC card and
the hospital authentication server respectively.
On the IC card, we have a POK module to store the master key Key1 and a
POKs-based Trivium generator to generate temporary keys. As illustrated in the
Figure 2, the IC card has the POK module, the Trivium stream generator, and
the CPU packed on one chip. The secret stored by the POK module can only
be accessed by the Trivium generator which outputs the bitstream directly to
the embedded CPU for cryptographic operations. The One-Time Programming
(OTP) interface [32] is added to enable one-time access to the secret during the
IC card commissioning. After the first access, the OTP interface is physically
disabled to prevent any direct access to the master key.
The doctor’s IC card also has a POK module to store the master key Key3
that is used for generating 256-bit message authentication code (MAC). The
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Fig. 2. IC card structure.
MAC algorithm is based on LFSR as described in [3], which is inherently resistant
to memory probe attacks and invasive attacks.
3 System Overview and Threat Model
Fig. 3. The enrollment phase.
3.1 System Overview
As shown in Figure 3, our access control system involves the following com-
ponents: the IMD, the programmer, the Hospital Authentication Server (HAS),
and IC cards for patients and doctors. IC cards are contact cards with embedded
POKs modules. The HAS is a centralized authentication server that is expected
to be common in modern hospital and e-health systems. Two pre-defined master
keys are shared by the patient’s IC card and the HAS with the IMD respectively.
Each master key is used as the secret seed to generate different temporary keys
for each access. Then the programmer authentication and the session key gen-
eration are all conducted with the temporary keys.
In our design, the patient’s and doctor’s IC cards are commissioned as the
representation of their identities via the enrollment phase. During the regular
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access, the doctor firstly plugs his IC card into the programmer to prove his
identity to the HAS. Then, the programmer forwards the challenge message
received from the IMD to the IC card and the HAS. Finally, the programmer
generates the correct response message with the help of the IC card and the
HAS and establishes a secure communication channel with the IMD. The HAS
enforces fine-grain access control policies according to the doctor’s identity and
the access operation type.
3.2 Assumptions
For devices, we assume the IMD and IC card are capable of running basic cryp-
tographic operations including SHA-256 and HMAC. While the programmer
has Internet access for communicating with the Hospital Authentication Server
(HAS). The IC cards are contact cards without wireless communication capa-
bility. We can safely assume IC cards are taken with patients and physicians all
the time considering its small size easy maintenance (no charging required).
As for the emergent situation when no Internet connection and valid physi-
cian’s IC card are available, we assume first-aiders can find the patient’s IC card
have the equipment to acquire the patient’s iris code.
3.3 Threat Model
In this paper, we assume a powerful adversary with abilities to eavesdrop all
wireless communications between the programmer and the IMD and send arbi-
trary messages to the IMD remotely.
Also, we reasonably assume the adversary cannot replicate the IC card or
retrieve the secret from it due to the POKs’s unclonable feature. The secret
keys stored in the IMD is also inaccessible because the IMDs are implanted into
patients’ body and are physically inaccessible. Also, the HAS is considered as
secure because the HAS has plenty of resources for enforcing security schemes
and is managed by professional security administrators.
4 The Authentication Protocol
In this section, we present our IMD authentication and access control protocol,
which is based on the a pair of temporary keys SAi and SBi and the doctor’s
master key Key3. The protocol is composed of four phases: Enrollment, Ser-
vice Request, Authorization, and Session Establishment. The following parties
are involved: an Implantable Medical Device (IMD), a Hospital authentication
Server (HAS), a Programmer (with the doctor’s IC card plugged in), and the
patient’s IC card. Table 1 summarizes all the symbols and notations used in our
description. Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the enrollment phase and all the
following phases, respectively.
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Table 1. Symbols and Notations.
Notation Description
Key3 doctor’s master key
SAi, SBi 256-bits temporary key pair
R 32-bits Service Request Code
i 32-bits counter
IDI , IDP , 32-bits identity for patient and
doctor
T1 32-bits Time stamp
TS 32-bits Time window threshold
T current time
token(i) token for the ith cycle
Skey(i) Session key for the ith cycle
4.1 Enrollment
During the enrollment phase, all parties in our protocol are initialized through
two independent steps as shown in Figure 3.
Doctor’s Registration Since we assume the programmer is not bound with the
doctor’s identity. Hence, registration is required to set up accounts for doctors
and link their identities with IC cards.
The doctor’s account should contain detailed profile information and the
master key Key3 extracted from the doctor’s IC card through the One-time
programming (OTP) interface. Aside from this, a corresponding identification
number IDP and password are also configured for login through the programmer.
Based on the profile information, HAS can check doctors’ privilege of accessing
a certain patient’s IMD for carrying out dynamic access control. For example,
all doctors that are in charge of a certain patient have the permission to ex-
port monitoring data from the patient’s ICD, but only the chief physician can
reconfigure it.
Patient’s Registration Similar to the doctors’ registration, patients also need
to set up accounts on the HAS which contain their profile information, the initial
value (IV ) and the master key Key2.
Before the implantation, the doctor extracts the master key Key1 from a new
IC card through the One-time programming (OTP) interface and then fusing the
OTP to prevent further access. After that, two master keys and IV are loaded
into the IMD and the cycle counter i is set to 1. Once the implantation is
completed, the IC card is delivered to the patient.
4.2 Service Request
During normal access circumstances, a patient is conscious, and the wireless
connection to the Internet is available. The doctor first inserts his/her IC card
into the programmer and the programmer then logs in with his account name
and password. Once the doctor’s identity is successfully verified, a TLS session
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Fig. 4. The authentication workflow.
between the programmer and HAS is established to protect all communications
between them, and the session is tagged by the doctor’s identity number IDP .
Thereafter, with the patient’s permission, the doctor has the patients IC card
inserted into the programmer.
As shown by step (i) in Figure 4, the service request is initiated by the pro-
grammer sending the request code and the doctor’s identity number to the IMD.
When the IMD wakes up from periodical hibernation, it first retrieves the cycle
counter i and produce the current temporal key pair SAi and SBi. Then, a
response containing the patient’s identity number IDI , counter i, current times-
tamp T1, and two HMACs over these variables are sent back to the programmer
(step (ii)) as the challenge message.
4.3 Authorization
When the programmer receives a response from the IMD in step (ii), it forwards
the two HMACs to the IC card and HAS respectively, as marked by step (iii)
and (v) in Figure 4. Specifically, for message (v), the programmer makes use of
the doctor’s IC card to generate a UMAC (a universal hashing based message
authentication [2]) for the entire message with the master key Key3 as a proof
of the doctor’s identity.
For the patient’s IC card, it generate the temporary key SAi according to
the received cycle counter i. With SAi, it verifies the received HMAC on T1. If
the verification succeeds, the IC card sends back the HMAC on the timestamp
T1 cascaded by request code R and increases its counter i by 1.
Similarly, the HAS generates the temporary key SBi and verifies the HMAC
of concatenated timestamp Ti and two identities: IDI and IDP . If the HMAC
is valid, the HAS performs following checks:
1. Check the temporal validity indicated by T1 and time window length TS.
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2. Check the doctor’s identity by verifying the UMAC with corresponding
Key3.
3. Check the doctor’s privilege level of accessing the the IMD with the identity
IDI .
If all checks are successful, the HAS sends back the HMAC of a timestamp,
two identity numbers and the request code R as described by the step (vi) in
Figure 4. Finally, HAS’s cycle counter i is increased by 1.
4.4 Session Establishment
After the programmer receives the returned HMACs from the patient’s IC card
and the HAS, the access token is generated by performing XOR operation on
the two HMACs as described in (1). Then the programmer sends the hash of
timestamp T1 and the token back to IMD (step (vii)).
token(i) =HMACSAi(T1||R)
⊕HMACSBi(T1||IDP ||IDI ||R)
(1)
On receiving the response from the programmer, the IMD first records the
current time T and checks whether the response is returned within the time win-
dow TS. If the response is timely enough, the IMD generates the token token′
(as shown in (1)) by itself independently (the IMD possesses both two master
keys to produce both two temporary keys SAi and SBi). After that, the IMD
compares the received Hash(T1||Token) with the generated Hash(T1||Token′).
If two results match, the programmer is authenticated and authorized to access
the IMD, and the cycle counter in the IMD is increased by 1. Otherwise, the IMD
discards all completed steps and goes back to listening mode. Once the authen-
tication and authorization is completed, a secret number SKey(i) is generated
independently by the IMD and the programmer. The two parties calculate the
XOR of two hashed HMACs as described in (2). The secret key can be used
as the seed for deriving session keys to encrypt the communication between the
programmer and the IMD.
SKey(i) =Hash(HMACSAi(T1||R))
⊕Hash(HMACSBi(T1||IDP ||IDI ||R))
(2)
5 Enhancement
5.1 Emergent Access
Apart from the normal access control described in section 4, special access mode
is necessary for the emergent situation when the patient is unconscious and re-
quire emergency care. Under this situation, first aiders may need to access the
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patient’s IMD to measurement the patient’s physiological signal and perform
timely treatment. However, the response message generated by the HAS may be
inaccessible due to the lack of valid privilege or the absence of the Internet con-
nections. To address this problem, we design an offline emergent access control
scheme to use the temporal keys SBi cached inside the patient’s IC card as an
alternative of the HAS. For the security concern, the cached keys are obfuscated
using the patient’s iris code.
The HAS can generate patient specified number of temporal keys for future
authentication rounds in advance and load them into the patient’s IC card during
the patient’s normal visit to the medical center. With the cached temporal key
SBi, the programmer can independently generate the correct response message
as the step (vi) in Figure 4. When cached temporal keys are invalidated by
regular accesses, the patient can easily the cached updtated by asking the HAS
to generate more.
5.2 Biometric Encryption of the Cached Temporary Key
The drawback of the cached keys is the possible leakage of temporary keys.
Since the cache keys are used as a substitution of HAS, disclosure of them would
undermine the effectiveness of HAS. For instance, if attackers steal the patient’s
IC card, they can initiate access to the IMD immediately because both two
temporary keys can be obtained from the IC card. Under this situation, the
patient has no way to protect himself even he/she realizes the lost and report
it to HAS manager. As a result, cached temporal keys must be encrypted to
prevent unauthorized accesses. We denote each cache item as
cache(i) = i||EnCk(SBi)
where i is the counter and the Ck is the cache encryption key. The cache en-
cryption key Ck is secured with the biometric encryption where the patient’s iris
code is exploited to obfuscate the original message as described in [21].
Here, we give some brief retelling about the biometric encryption we use.
First, a binary string is derived from an infrared image of patient’s iris image
by demodulating the phase information with complex-valued 2D Gabor wavelets
[5]. The generated reference string, denoted as Θref , is acquired in the patient
register phase. After that, the HAS generates the cache encryption key Ck and
the key is encoded by Hadamard code and Reed-Solomon code. The encoded Ck
is then obfuscated by the iris reference Θref and the resulted Θlock is stored in
patient’s IC card.
During emergent situation, first aiders can use a digital camera (with in-
frared mode) to capture the patient’s iris image and generate the sample binary
string Θsam to decrypt Θlock with the XOR operation and then acquire Ck by
doing Hadamard and Reed-Solomon decoding. After getting the XORed cache
encryption key Ck, first aiders are capable of decrypting the temporary key SBi
and access the patient’s IMD locally without the HAS’s support. The robustness
of cache key regeneration is guaranteed by Hadamard and Reed-Solomon code
which deals with errors in a binary level and block level respectively.
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Fig. 5. Iris code assisted emergent access.
5.3 Recovery Mode
To deal with the issue of patients losing their IC cards, we design a recovery
mechanism to reset the IMD and pair it with a new IC card. For the security
concern of the recovery mode, the patient needs to go to the hospital to report the
lost and sign the related documents in person before starting the reset procedure.
A programmer operated by the security administrator is granted with the reset
permission by the HAS. The recovery mode is triggered by the programmer with
a designated service request code. Upon receiving the reset request, the IMD
begins to continuously challenge the programmer as shown in Figure 6. During
the challenge process, the IMD asks the programmer to provide the temporary
key SB for the cycle counter K. The challenge is conducted continuously for
2 ∗ S times where S is the maximum number of cached temporary keys for the
emergent access. The reset command is accepted and executed by the IMD if
the programmer can provide correct responses to all those challenges with the
help of the HAS. When the reset succeeds, the IMD rollback to the registration
status to accept the configuration of new master keys Key1 and Key2. Thus,
the doctor can re-do the patient’s registration procedures to pair the IMD with
a new IC card, and the old stolen IC card is invalidated permanently.
6 Security Analysis
6.1 Active Attacks
In active attacks, adversaries intercept the transmission between the IMD and
the programmer and then manipulate the message to deceive the them. How-
ever, the identities of the IMD, the programmer, and the HAS are secured by
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Fig. 6. The recovery process.
master keys or kept in the server or the POKs enabled IC card. Even if adver-
saries can successfully intercept those messages, there is no way to retrieve the
valid temporal keys for the current cycle. Without temporal keys, adversaries
cannot generate valid HMAC for the tampered message. The reply attack is
also not feasible due to the implementation of the time window. The IMD and
the programmer would reject all duplicate packets that are outside of the time
window.
Another type of active attack is extracting credentials from the IC card
through invasive ways. There have been a lot of methods to recover security
credentials by tampering IC card circuits [13, 33, 42]. However, with the master
key secured by POKs, any attempt to tamper the circuit would fail and destroy
the secret credential permanently.
6.2 Desynchronization attack
A lot of PUFs-based authentication protocols that rely on synchronization are
subject to the desynchronization attack. Normally, the desynchronization attack
is achieved by intentional interruptions during normal authentication, which
results in the temporary key generator in different components running at mal-
posed cycles. In our work, the desynchronization attack could be avoided by
applying one-step cache in the IC card and the HAS for the previous used tem-
porary keys SAi−1 and SBi−1. Since the IMD only increases its cycle counter i
when authorized by the IC card and the HAS succeeds, the desynchronization
condition only happens when the IMD’s counter is one step slower than the IC
card or the HAS. When the IC card and the HAS receive the counter from the
programmer at step (iii) and (v) in Figure 4, they can easily recover from the
desynchronization status with the help of cached keys.
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6.3 Identity impersonation attack
The adversaries may disguise themselves as legitimate physicians and use a pro-
grammer to access patients’ IMDs. This kind of identity fraud is prevented in
our scheme by the doctor’s identity proof at step (v) in Figure 4. To impersonate
a legitimate doctor, the attacker must get the corresponding doctor’s identity
IC card. Even if the attacker can steal a valid IC card from doctors, the stolen
identities are not universally applicable to all IMDs, which restrict the range of
damage. Also, this kind of attack cannot bypass the touch-to-access assumption
because of requirement of the patient’s IC card. It is difficult to use the IC card
without the patient’s permission. Through physical contacts with the patient,
attackers are highly likely to be spotted and recorded by other people or video
monitoring systems which greatly undermines the power of attacks.
6.4 Security of the emergent access
Many previous attempts introduced additional risk by adding an emergent access
mode. For example, cloaker [17] and IMDGuard [47] rely on external devices to
secure the IMD. When these external devices are removed, the IMD switches to
open access. This can cause potential risk when the external device is stolen or
the patient forgets to take it. Instead of trying to let the IMD be aware of the
emergent situation, the IMD in our design always runs in the same mode, which
means the aforementioned touch-to-access assumption always holds in emergent
access since the temporary key SAi can only be acquired from the patient’s IC
card. To exploit the emergent access, attackers must get the patient’s IC card
and iris image. Even if the IC card is obtained by attackers without breaching
the touch-to-access assumption (e.g., lost by the patient), the iris image must
be captured in front of the patient. Additionally, cached keys in the IC card can
be easily invalidated after the patient loses his/her card by rolling the normal
access for multiple rounds to override the cached SBs. After that, attackers
will not be able to access the patient’s IMD even if they get the patient’s iris
code. The security of the iris code has been extensively discussed and many
counterfeit iris detection schemes are proposed in [14, 29, 44]. However, most
of the counterfeit iris attack (e.g., cosmetic lens with texture, printed iris on
paper) has the prerequisite of acquiring high resolution of the victim’s Iris NIR
image. The NIRs that are used to illuminate the iris only has the effective range
of 50∼70 cm [22]. The successful iris code generation requires a resolution of
at least 50 pixels in iris radius for the iris picture [4]. As a result, it is hard
for attackers to get the usable iris image without breaching the touch-to-access
assumption.
6.5 Security of Trivium
Unlike the block cipher such as AES, there is not a widely recognized secure
stream cipher. Trivium has been selected as part of the eSTREAM project [39].
Up to now, no effective analysis attack is proposed that is better than the brute
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force search. Existing attacks utilizing the side channel like Differential Power
attack [28] and Fault Injection attack [35] all require hardware tampering of the
cipher IC. This kind of hardware attack is impractical in our design because of
the use of tampering-resistant POKs. Once the circuit is tampered, the master
key will be destroyed permanently. Moreover, the passive analysis is also not
applicable to our design. The output of the Trivium stream generator, the tem-
porary key SAi, and SBi are never transmitted directly over the air. Instead,
they are only used as keys for HMAC operations.
7 Evaluation
Because commercial IMDs are not opensourced for customization, we implement
our design on our own testbed which comprises a TelosB sensor mote, a Rasp-
berry Pi and a Laptop to simulate the IMD, programmer, and HAS respectively.
As stated in [47], Telosb sensor mote is built on the similar low-energy plat-
form as commercial IMDs making it a good choice to simulate the overhead of
our system on real IMDs. With the prototype implementation, we evaluate the
overhead of the consumption of energy, time, memory, and storage for both the
computation process and communication.
7.1 Overhead Statistics
To evaluate the overhead, we make statistics about all computing and commu-
nicating operations conducted by the IMD during an access cycle as shown in
Table 2 and Table 3.
Table 2. Computing statistics.
Steps Operation Amount Length (bits)
Service Request HMAC 2 32, 96
Keypair Generation Trivium 2 256, 256
SHA-256 2 256, 256
Token Generation HMAC 2 32, 128
Session Key Generation SHA-256 2 256, 256
Table 3. Communication statistics.
Steps Operation Length (bits)
Service Request Receiving 64
Sending 608
Token verifying Receiving 256
7.2 Experiment Results
We split the design into several parts, one for the key generator and others for
the HMAC and SHA-256 operations. By deploying asynchronous counters, we
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record the time consumption of each part with the accuracy of 1 millisecond.
With the energy consumption model [7,36,43] for TelosB as shown in Table 4, the
energy consumption for each operation is calculated from the time consumption.
Table 4. TelosB power consumption model.
Operation Power consumption(mW )
Transmit 69
Listen 60
Receiving 61
Computing(active) 4.8
Computing(idle) 4.5
Sleep 0.035
The total computing time for a complete authentication cycle is 367ms, if
the transmission time is not taken into account. The overhead for different parts
is listed in Table 5.
Table 5. Overhead for computation.
generator HMAC SHA256
Time(ms) 52 46 15
Energy(µJ) 249 220.8 72
ROM(bytes) 14290 6022 4792
RAM(bytes) 312 282 197
Unlike the computational part, the overhead for transmission is much more
complex because of the utilization of low power listening and collision avoiding
mechanisms in the MAC layer. The listening time is uncertain depending on the
environment noise, and the power consumption on synchronizations is difficult
to specify. Therefore, to make things easier, we test the overhead of broadcasting
packets with no retransmission. The results of the transmission test are listed in
Table 6.
Table 6. Overhead for communication.
Receiving Sending
(320 bits) (608 bits)
Time(ms) 40 22
Energy(µJ) 2440 1518
ROM(bytes) 11140 11182
RAM(bytes) 501 513
With the operation specific evaluation results, ensemble time and energy
overhead are calculate as illustrated in Equation (3) and (4) .
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E =Ecomp + ETx + ERx
=Egen + 4 ∗ EHMAC + 3 ∗ ESha256 + ETx + ERx
=249µJ + 4 ∗ 220.8µJ + 3 ∗ 72µJ + 2440µJ + 1518µJ
=5306µJ
(3)
T =Tcomp + TTx + TRx
=Tgen + 4 ∗ THMAC + 3 ∗ TSha256 + TTx + TRx
=52ms+ 4 ∗ 46ms+ 3 ∗ 15ms+ 40ms+ 22ms
=343ms
(4)
The results indicate that our design introduces orders of magnitude lower
energy and time overhead to the IMD compared with state-of-art physiological-
feature-based solutions: The energy consumption of the OPFKA [26] ranges from
about 70 mJ to 1000 mJ according to the coffer size. The IMDguard [47] needs
at least 45 seconds to measure more than 21 heart beats. While, the Heart-
to-heart [41] uses TLS communication where the RSA encryption itself takes
5000000 cpu cycles (equivalent to 100 ms and 3038 µJ on the platform used by
the author).
8 Related Work
8.1 Pre-loaded-Key Based Solutions
In some early works of IMD security, a long-term and device-specific credential
is pre-loaded into the IMD and the programmer must possess the corresponding
credential to pass the authentication. Halperin et al. [20] propose a acoustic side
channel based solution where programmer need a valid master key to access
the IMD. Li et al. [30] present a rolling code based authentication scheme, in
which the IMD and the programmer share a pair of encryption keys that are
used to encrypt a sequence number. Liu et al. Denning et al. [8] uses visual
objects to carry a static credential for the IMD authentication. This type of
IMD authentication/authorization schemes are obsoleted because the difficulty
to protect the pre-loaded credential.
8.2 Physiological Feature Based Solutions
Recent researches tend to establish temporary keys by extracting time-varying
information from patient’s physiological signals. Most of them are also based
on the touch-to-access assumption as our work does because the physiological
features used for key generation can only be measured when the programmer
is physically close to the patient. In [26, 41, 47, 49], the patient’s ECG features
are utilized to derive credentials due to its high level of randomness. In [22], the
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access credentials are extracted from the patient’s biometric features such as the
fingerprints, iris and height.
This type of solutions face the problem of reliability: accurate measurement
of physiological value is difficult because of the noise and distortion which results
in long time consumption for feature measurement. Also, all these requires the
IMDs to be equipped with special sensors to measure physiological signals such
as ECG which not only increase the cost of IMDs but also causes excessive power
consumption.
8.3 Proxy Based Solutions
Some researches propose to utilize additional devices to authenticate the pro-
grammer on behalf of the IMD for reducing the IMD’s power consumption.The
common design of proxy-based security schemes [9, 18, 47, 48] includes (1) the
proxy device jams the signal of external programmers until they are authenti-
cated; (2) the IMD allows open-access when the proxy is not in proximity.
The Shield [18] jams the programmer’s signal, but also the IMD’s signal.
Equipped with a full-duplex radio with two antennas, Shield is able to receive
and decode the IMD’s signal, meanwhile jamming it so that the programmer can-
not receive and decode the complete IMD’s message. A secured communication
channel is assumed to have been set up between the Shield and the legitimate
programmer. Therefore, Shield actually serves as a relay between the IMD and
the programmer. Similarly, Cloaker [9] is also a mediator that forwards all au-
thorized communications between the IMD and programmer.
In the other schemes [47, 48], the proxy devices are mainly considered as
an external authenticator, which stores the public keys of all authorized pro-
grammers and are able to verify the identity of the programmer that requests
for access using its digital signature. The communication channel between the
IMD and the programmer is established, after the programmer is successfully
authenticated. In [47], a pair of lightweight symmetric keys are issued to the
IMD and the programmer, to encrypt their future communications. In [48], the
authentication proxy is embedded into a gateway.
This type of solutions requires patients to carry the active proxy device all
the time which is unpractical. Also, the jamming may cause interference on other
medical devices.
9 Conclusion
Security and low power consumption are among the most critical goals when
designing access control schemes for implantable medical devices, while how to
attain both high energy efficiency and resiliency to powerful attacks, such as
memory scanning and physical tampering, is still an unresolved challenge. We
propose to take Physically Obfuscated Keys (POKs) as the hardware root of
trust to establish a highly secure access control scheme for IMDs, and apply
the idea of computation offloading to saving energy consumption on the IMD
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side. We have comprehensively analyzed the security of the proposed scheme and
compared it with some well-known mechanisms. In addition to its security ad-
vantage, a prototype system implemented on the TelosB platform demonstrates
its high energy efficiency.
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